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\, Introduction1 
Since the fall of the Bretton Woods agreement and the rise of a floating exchange 
rate regime, there has been a marked increase in the volatility of exchange rates. The 
movement of exchange rates relative to other currencies, or exchange rate variability is 
seen as a risk by importers and exporters. The uncertainty surrounding exchange rate 
movements affects importers and exporters who must determine domestic prices of 
traded goods without knowing how the exchange rate will move between the time an 
order is placed and the time payment is due. Theory supports that as exchange rate 
variability increases, ceteris paribus, international trade will fall. 
In the past, empirical studies of exchange rate variability and trade have not been 
very supportive of theory. Yeager's study (1976) observes trade and exchange rate 
variability during World Wars I and II, before the current floating exchange rate system 
was in place. His study finds no significant relationship between exchange rate 
variability and international trade. Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) find no significant 
effect of exchange rate uncertainty on the volume of trade, Makin (1976) notes an 
"encouraging indication that real trade flows are not highly sensitive to the exchange' 
rate regime" (p. 33). More recent studies have found different results in empirical 
modeling of exchange rate variability. Coes (1981) and Cushman (1983) find a 
significant negative effect on the level of trade for a number of cases. 
This paper examines the effect of exchange rate variability on the level of imports 
of the countries of the CFA Franc Zonel , a monetary union in Africa. Section II will 
discuss the history and structure governing the CFA Franc Zone members. I will 
present the theoretical basis for this study in section III, discuss the data and choice of 
variables in section IV, present the empirical model and results in section V, and make 
some concluding remarks in section VI. 
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II. The CFA Franc lone 
The CFA Franc lone is an interesting combination of a monetary union and a 
fixed exchange rate regime. The Zone was formed in 1948, when CFA stood for les 
Colonies Francais d'Afrique and served to ease administrative duties for France. When 
the colonies were granted independence from France in 1960, some countries opted to 
leave the Zone, but the acronym CFA is still used by the remaining countries. Today, 
the Zone consists of fourteen independent nations throughout Africa, each belonging to 
one of three central banks of the monetary union. Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote O'lvoire, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo belong to the Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de 
I'Ouest (BCEAO). Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea and Gabon use the Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (BEAC). The 
fourteenth member of the Zone, the Comoros, uses the Central Bank of the Comoros. 
As mentioned earlier, the Zone is actually made up of three central banks, each 
printing its own currency. These currencies, however, are referred to by the same 
name, the CFA franc (CFAF). Each version of the CFAF is pegged to the French franc 
(FF) at a parity of 50 CFAF to 1 FF. The parity can only be changed by unanimous 
agreement between France and the CFA member nations, and has only been changed 
once in its history3. France guarantees full convertibility of the CFAF to the FF, 
maintained through an operations account at the French Treasury (not the central bank 
of France), which is supported by special agreements between France and each central 
bank of the union. As witnessed through the structure of the Zone, France still plays a 
vital role in the operations of these countries. This is especially true with regard to aid 
and balance of payments shortfalls-at which time, the operations account at the 
treasury acts "much like the resources of the IMF" (Medhora 1992, p. 163)4. 
By observing the Zone's history, studies generally agree that member nations 
derived definite gains from the union. Devarajan's 1987 paper points to faster economic 
growth within the CFA as compared to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Conway 
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(1993) notes lower money creation and inflation in CFA nations than in other developing 
countries, Medhora (1990) finds that nominal exchange rate instability has not affected 
the Zone's imports, and Agenor (1994) defines the "credibility effect" through which 
pegging to a stable currency has proven the most beneficial asset to CFA members. 
However, majority of the most recent studies have been less certain about the overall 
benefit of the Zone to its members. Assane and Pourgerami (1994) found no difference 
in growth between the CFA and other SSA countries; Allechi (1994) found there to be 
more net losers than net gainers when looking at the partial reserves pooling used by 
CFA members; Savvides (1995) agrees that historically, the CFA has shown better 
performance with respect to SSA, but that "relative performance worsened during the 
latter part of the 1980's" (449). 
These studies question the benefits derived from the Franc Zone. The Zone 
members experienced years of stability not witnessed in other African nations. The later 
studies are a reaction to rising economic instability for Zone members over the last 
decade. Throughout the 1980's and 1990's, the Zone countries began to experience 
serious balance of payments problems, rising external debts, fiscal arrears and general 
economic turmoil. For example, real GOP growth rose above 8% in 1974, but fell below 
zero several times over the last decade. The total external debt among CFA members 
has skyrocketed from $1 billion in 1970, to $17 billion in 1980, and reached almost $50 
billion in 1993. Growth of per capita income has plummeted, with negative growth rates 
over most of the last decade. The graphs on the next page depict the downturn (World 
Tables Database). 
Some studies have alleged that France's change to a tighter monetary policy may 
have contributed to the economic downturn of the Zone. Both Allechi (1994) and van de 
Walle (1994) note France's increased efforts to keep French inflation at or below 
German inflation and the French franc in line with the Deutchmark beginning in 1983. 
The recent economic downturn can be attributed to several factors, but "in some sense, 
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France's African partners are also paying the cost of her changing European and global 
ambitions" (van de Walle 47). 
III. A Theoretical Analysis of the Volume of Trade 
Theory supports that exchange rate variability has an effect on trade. A complete 
model of trade must be developed in order to test this effect for the countries of the CFA 
Franc Zone. This section will set forth the determinants of the volume of international 
trade, including a full discussion of exchange rate variability. 
A. Exchange Rate Variability 
1. Variability and Risk 
Exchange rate variability is simply the volatility of one nation's currency value 
relative to other currencies. This volatility causes exchange rate risk for merchants in 
both countries whenever a future payment must be made or received in a foreign 
currency, since merchants cannot tell which direction or magnitude exchange rates will 
move over the coming days, weeks, or months. Flexible exchange rates are laden with 
uncertainty which reduces the volume of international trade (Salvatore 1995, p. 651). 
Trade theory suggests that if merchants are risk averse, as exchange rate variability 
increases, the volume of international trade will fall, ceteris paribus, due to increased 
risk faced by importers and exporters. 
Exchange rate risk affects trade by forcing higher costs upon the merchants 
involved. This extra cost associated with the volatility, or urisk premium," can take on 
one of two forms. By hedging in forward markets, an importer takes out a loan in the 
currency of the transaction at the present spot rate and deposits that sum in a bank until 
the payment is due. The risk premium, in this case, is the positive difference between 
the interest he has to pay on his loan and the lower interest he earns on the bank 
deposit. Though there is a cost to this method, the importer avoids the possibility that 
the spot rate will rise between the present and the time the payment is due (Salvatore 
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1995). The other means by which a risk premium is realized is by taking a loss. In this 
case, the importer takes a chance by not hedging and loses if the spot rate rises before 
payment is due. There is a possibility to gain by not hedging, but if we assume risk­
averse merchants, there is still a premium for the gamble. In either case, the risk 
premium is positive and the volume of trade will be negatively affected by exchange rate 
instability. 
2. The Currency Peg and its Relationship to Exchange ate Variability 
If one nation's currency is fixed relative to that of its trading partners, there should 
be no exchange rate variability. Trade should not be adversely affected, but rather 
encouraged since trade would occur without exchange rate risk. This is the case when 
discussing trade among CFA member nations as well as their trade with France. The 
common currency among the member states of the Zone and the fixed parity with 
France facilitate trade between these nations because there is no variability5. 
However, trade between the CFA and non-member countries (other than France) 
will be adversely affected by exchange rate variability since the French franc floats freely 
on international markets. It is easy to see that as the FF appreciates or depreciates 
relative to a foreign currency, so too would the CFAF appreciate or depreciate against 
that same currency, and if the variability of the FF to the CFA's trading partners 
increases, trade between the CFA and its trading partners will be adversely affected. 
3. Trade Diversification 
In the earlier years of the Franc Zone's existence, the majority of the Zone's trade 
was with France, obviously as a result of the colonial heritage. Even in the mid-1960's, 
trade with France was nearly 50% of the Zone's trade, but since then, trade has 
diversified away from France. By the mid-1980's, 30% of the Zone's trade was with 
France, with much of the trade shifting to other European countries6 (Boughton 1992, 
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p.35). The graph below shows that as trade has diversified away from France, the rest 
of the Europe has absorbed a large part of that trade. Collectively, the European 
Economic Community (EEC) accounts for a majority of the Zone's trade, as shown 
below. 
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Even Europe's total share in the Zone's trade has fallen. One can conclude that 
as trade has shifted to countries whose bilateral exchange rates with the CFA are more 
volatile than those of France and European countries. The increased trade with 
countries that the Zone is not pegged to will increase exchange rate variability, and the 
volume of trade for Zone members should fall, ceteris paribus. Empirical studies, such 
as Medhora's 1990 study of exchange rate variability in the Franc Zone, note that as the 
CFA's trade diversifies further away from the Franc Zone and France, exchange rate 
variability will rise. Medhora predicts that the continued rise in exchange rate variability 
will make variability a more significant determinant of trade in the future (p. 320). 
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B. National Income Level 
Even the most basic trade model includes some measure of national income as a 
determinant of trade. An increase in a country's level of income will increase the 
possibility that it can import. The change in imports associated with a change in income 
level is the marginal propensity to import, or MPM. If a country's MPM is assumed to be 
positive (non-zero), then as income levels rise, so should the level of imports (Salvatore 
1995, p. 521). A nation's level of exports will depend on the national income levels and 
the MPM's of its trading partners (p. 522). 
C. Trade and Aid 
Countries give aid for several reasons: national security interest, economic self­
interest and altruism appear to be the most prominent (Noel & Theiren 1995, p. 525). 
The economic self-interest of donor countries can make imports depend on aid. /'Tying" 
aid, the practice where receipt of aid is contingent upon purchases of goods and 
services from the donor country will have an effect on the import levels of the recipient. 
Assume a CFA country, Benin, is offered aid which is tied, from a donor country, such 
as France. Tied aid would require that Benin purchase certain goods, such as 
agricultural machinery or capital equipment from France. In this case, Benin's imports 
increase due to an offer of tied aid. Studies have found that 78% of aid from the 
Netherlands was tied during 1972-76, at least 80% of German aid was tied (no time 
period given), and 74% of aid from the United Kingdom was tied in 1984 (White and 
Woestman 1994, p. 543). 
D. Currency Valuation 
If the CFAF is away from its equilibrium exchange rate, or misaligned, trade will 
be affected. The level of misalignment can be measured by using Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) theory, which states that the domestic price level, P, is equal to the foreign 
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price level, P*, multiplied by the equilibrium nominal exchange rate, e, or P=eP* (e is 
measured as domestic currency / foreign currency). When PPP holds, e (P*/P)= 1, and 
the exchange rate adjusts in reaction to differences in international price levels. The 
change in the exchange rate serves to keep purchasing power of the currency equal 
between countries. (Salvatore 1995, p. 493). For countries with a fixed exchange rate, 
when foreign and domestic price levels diverge, the exchange rate cannot adjust to 
equalize relative prices. This causes a misaligned real exchange rate. 
If domestic price levels rise more than foreign price levels and the exchange rate 
cannot adjust to the differences in price level, then e(P*fP) < 1, and the domestic 
currency is considered to be overvalued. If a currency is overvalued, the country's 
exports are less competitive on international markets and exports will tend to fall while 
imports will rise. If the currency is undervalued, or e(P*/P) > 1, the country's exports 
are more competitive, and exports will rise while imports will fall (Gillis et. al. 1992, p. 
451). In either case, the level of a nation's exchange rate will affect its level of exports 
and imports. 
IV. Derivation of the Empirical Model 
Now that the theoretical determinants of the volume of international trade have 
been identified, an empirical basis for the study can be formulated. This section outlines 
a quantative means to define each variable of the model. 
A.	 Optimal Model for Trade 
The empirical model driven by the theory of the previous section is: 
Volume Exchange National 
of = a1 + ~ Rate + a3 Income + a4Tied + as Currency + u 
Imports Variability Level Aid Valuation 
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The volume of imports is expected to fall as exchange rate variability increases or as the 
currency becomes more overvalued. Import volume is expected to increase with a rise 
in national income levels or a rise in tied aid, ceteris paribus. 
There are several measures of trade that would theoretically show the effect of 
exchange rate variability. Because of the structure of the Zone's trade, this study will 
use the volume of imports for CFA member countries as the dependent variable. The 
volume of exports would be inappropriate for several reasons. There is great diversity in 
the exports of the Zone members. Since several Zone members are primarily 
agricultural, exports of some CFA countries are largely a function of weather, which 
would be difficult to control for. Furthermore, government policies to increase 
development may also support exports. These policies, such as subsidies and tax 
protection, are also difficult to find and control for. A model might be able to overcome 
these problems if the study is only estimated for one or two countries, however, this 
study uses twelve of the CFA member countries, making modeling of weather and 
government policy nearly impossible. The Zone's imports however, should be less 
difficult to model. The imports of the Zone are mainly manufactured goods, including 
machinery and industrial products (CIA 1992), whose prices and quantities do not 
depend on factors that fluctuate wildly, such as weather. 
B. Exchange Rate Variabifity 
Previous studies have adopted several different measures of variability. 
Comparison of past forward and current spot exchange rates have been used in several 
studies (Makin 1976, Hooper & Kohlhagen 1978) as a measure of variability, but the 
CFA countries do not have well developed forward markets and any existing forward 
price data are not readily available. Medhora (1990) uses the standard deviation of a 
quarterly nominal effective exchange rate, which is a trade weighted index of spot 
exchange rates, to measure variability. The nominal index was used in an attempt to 
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separate price risk from exchange rate risk, making the measure of variability include 
only exchange rate risk. Recall that according to Purchasing Power Parity theory, the 
exchange rate will equalize relative prices between two countries. Thus, when PPP 
holds, exchange rate risk and price risk should offset each other. The real risk faced by 
merchants is when PPP does not hold and exchange rate risk and price risk do not 
offset each other. By using only exchange rate risk from a nominal index, past studies 
have ignored PPP theory and did not get a full measure of total risk. Three studies 
(Kenen 1980, Coes 1981, and Cushman 1983) use some form ofthe real exchange 
rate, which accounts for both exchange rate risks and price risks, to measure exchange 
rate variability. 
This study will use the purchasing power parity definition of the real exchange 
rate (RER) as a basis for measuring variability. The RER = e (P*/P), measures the 
relative valuation of goods between two countries. When the RER is weighted with 
respect to all of a nations trading partners, it becomes a real effective exchange rate 
(REER), and is defined as the relative price of tradable goods with respect to non­
tradable goods. The REER measures a country's level of competitiveness on 
international markets, such that a fall in the REER, or real exchange rate depreciation, 
indicates a decline in the country's competitiveness (Edwards 1988, p.3). The REER in 
this study is defined as: 
n P*REERi = l: e jJ w.j jJ JPj=1 
The real effective exchange rate for CFA country i, which has n trading partners 
is the bilateral exchange rate, ej defined as (CFAF/ j's currency) 7, multiplied by the 
foreign price level, P*, over the domestic price level, P, and a trade weight, Wj (the 
percent of i's imports from j). The index is calculated for each country of the Franc 
Zone for each year of the study--1974 to 1992. 
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The REER alone does not measure variability. It is a yearly average of relative 
prices of tradable and non-tradable goods. It cannot incorporate any measure of 
variability or risk as a single yearly average. To show the volatility of the exchange rate, 
this study will use the percent change in the REER from year (t-1) to year t to explain 
imports in year t. This will measure actual changes that show uncertainty and should 
affect the level of imports. 
C. Nafionallncome Level 
Gross Domestic Product (GOP) is used as a measure of the national income 
level. Real GOP is used over nominal GOP in order to remove the effects of inflation. 
As real GOP rises, imports are also expected to rise. Data for real GOP are found in the 
World Tables Database. 
D. Tied Aid 
The vast majority of aid tying is unreported, thus there are no data available that 
can be used to show a clear effect of tied aid on import volume. This study will use 
Official Transfers, monetary grants received from a donor government, as a measure of 
total aid to each CFA country. ot all official transfers are tied, only an unknown portion 
of them. As official transfers increase, this study assumes that the amount of tied aid in 
the figure increases proportionally. Thus an increase in official transfers will have a 
positive effect on imports of the recipient country because some portion of the official 
transfers are tied. Data for official transfers are also found in the World Tables 
Database. 
E. CUffency Valuation 
The real exchange rate (RER) between France and the CFA countries will be 
used as a measure of the amount of currency misalignment. This is not the same as the 
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variability index, because it does not include all of a nation's trading partners, only 
France. The RER = e (P*/P) where e is the bilateral exchange rate between France and 
the CFA (CFAF/FF), P* is the price level of France, and P is the price level of the CFA 
country that the RER is calculated for. The RER used in this form will show the relative 
overvaluation of the CFA franc (Edwards 1988, pp. 47-8). Recall that if the CFAF 
becomes overvalued, the level of imports should rise, and if the CFAF becomes 
undervalued, the level of imports should fall. Over time, price levels in France have 
risen more slowly than price levels in the CFA nations. This would lead to a fall in the 
RER, w ich corresponds to a decline in competitiveness for CFA goods, making 
imported goods become relatively more attractive compared to domestically produced 
ones. The real exchange rate with France will capture the effect of misalignment since 
the French Franc floats freely on international markets, and is thus aligned with other 
currencies. If the CFA Franc is misaligned with the French Franc, then the CFA Franc is 
also misaligned with the currencies that the French Franc floats against. A negative 
relationship is expected between the RER and imports, since a fall in the RER leads to a 
rise in imports. 
V. Actual Empirical Model and R~y'lt~ 
A. The Empirical Model 
Based on the theoretical framework and proxies presented in the above 
discussion, tlhe model used in the study is: 
Imports = 0.1 + L o.j country dummy + au Variability + 0.14 GDP+ o. lS Official Transfers + o. l6RER + u 
When running the model with Ordinary Least Squares, tests showed that autocorrelation 
was present, so the relationship was tested using a generalized least squares equation 
on a pooled sample of CFA countries, over the period 1974-1992. 
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Membership in the Franc Zone has not changed significantly over the past fifty 
years, but the changes that have occurred must be reflected in this study. Mali left the 
Zone at independence, but has since rejoined the Zone. Although it did not join the 
BCEAO until 1984, Mali has been a member of the Franc Zone since 1967 
(Berg & Berlin 1993, p. B-3). Since its trade has been affected by France and this study 
specifies the Zone for the study (instead of a specific monetary union within the Zone), 
Mali will be included in the entire study. However, two countries will not be included: 
Equatorial Guinea which joined the Zone in 1984, and the Comoros which did not join 
the Zone until after 1992 (Berg, Appendix B, p.2). 
A series of dummy variables to control for country have been included to account 
for cross-sectional differences among countries. This includes such things as resource 
allocations and govemment programs aimed at trade issues, as well as the different 
needs of the countries with regard to imports. For example, some inland countries of 
the CFA Franc Zone must import food. These trade flows will be less reactive to 
changes in price and exchange rate levels, since a certain level of consumption must be 
maintained for survival. 
B. Results 
Dependent Variable: Imports 
Sample size: 210 
adjusted R2: 0.6795 
Expected Actual Coefficient 
Variable Definition Sign (t statistic) 
Variability % change in 
RER index 
-
-0.1987*** 
(2.3625) 
GOP Gross Domestic 
Product 
+ 0.4680*** 
(5.0769) 
AID Official Transfers 
to CFA nations 
+ 1.3330 -* 
(4.0788) 
RER Real Exchange 
Rate with France 
-
9.683 *** 
(3.1086) 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
14 
Overall, the model performs fairly well. The adjusted R2 is 0.6795, meaning that 
the regression is able to account for almost 68% of the variation of the CFA Franc 
Zone's imports. With one exception, individual variables also perform rather well. All 
but one coefficient estimated has the predicted sign, and each of those is statistically 
significant. 
Most importantly I the coefficient for exchange rate variability was estimated to be 
-0.1987, which means for every 1% increase in the variability, imports fall by $2,000. To 
put this in perspective, variability for Zone members averaged 71% a year (with a 
standard deviation of 37%). So, in the average year, the effect of exchange rate 
variability is a $143,000 fall in the level of imported goods, which is about 0.2% of the 
imports for an average Zone country. This may not seem like a large effect, but that 
figure can account for one year's imports from one trading partner. This study can 
conclude that exchange rate variability has a significant negative effect on the volume of 
imports for the CFA Franc Zone. 
The coefficient for GOP also performs in accordance with theory. The model 
estimates that for a $1 billion rise in GDP, imports rise by $468,000, ceteris paribus. 
Results show that imports react positively to a rise in national income. The effect of 
national income is important to the model and does improve the regression, since the 
variable is statistically significant at a very high level. 
The coefficient on the aid variable represents a $1.33 increase in imports for a 
$1.00 increase in official transfers. At first glance, this seems like an unreasonable 
figure, but due to the nature of tied aid, there is a very plausible explanation. Initial 
purchases required for receipt of tied aid can result in future purchases from the donor 
country (White and Woestman 1994, p.543). For example, a French engineer, paid with 
tied funds, may call for French made parts and eqUipment for the project, which would 
require that future repair expenditure also come partly from France. Although these 
goods are not tied originally, the purchase is a result of tied aid. 
15 
The variable for the Real Exchange Rate with France is the only variable that 
does not perform according to theory. According to this model, as the RER rises, 
imports also rise. There is no obvious explanation for why this variable does not behave 
as theory predicts. One possible explanation stems from the presence of 
autocorrelation in the OLS model. If autocorrelation is present, then there is some 
evidence that a variable is missing in the original model. The RER variable may be 
picking up some of the effect of the missing variable. A different proxy for relative 
currency valuation may yield more theoretically sound results. 
VI. Conclusion 
The majority of past empirical studies have not been able to find a significant 
effect of exchange rate variability on trade. This study, however, was able to find such 
an effect at a statically significant level for twelve members of the CFA Franc Zone. 
Empirical results were encouraging overall, but there is room for further research, 
especially in relation to CFA franc valuation. 
Recent studies find that the effect of exchange rate variability on trade is rising. 
As exchange rates become more variable and as trade diversifies away from France 
and other Zone members, the effect of exchange rate variability is more visible for the 
Zone. In the future, as trade diversifies further away from risk-free trading partners, the 
coefficient for exchange rate variability may be stronger and exhibit a larger effect on 
trade in the Franc Zone. 
The CFA Franc Zone must decide if the variability of the French franc is at an 
acceptable level. As it stands now, the effect of exchange rate variability is probably not 
large enough to warrant any major policy changes. However, if variability increases in 
the future, the structure of the Zone's trade and monetary policy may need to be 
changed. A short term solution to high exchange rate variability would be to encourage 
trade to shift back to France, the Zone, and Europe in order to decrease the level of 
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variability. A more involved action. a possibility only in the long term and with very high 
exchange rate variability. would question the fixed exchange rate regime as a whole, 
since the Zone cannot make its own exchange rate policy when tied to the French 
franc. 
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Notes 
1 I would like to thank my project advisor, Or. Pamela Lowry, as well as the rest of 
my Research Honors committee, Or. Robert Leekley, Or. James Simeone, and Or. Frank 
Boyd, for their support and helpful comments throughout the spring semester. I would 
also like to thank Or. Michael Seeborg for supervision during the early stages of the 
project. Any remaining mistakes are, of course, my own. 
2 The acronym CFA stands for either la Communaute Finaciere d'Afrique (the 
African Financial Community) or la Cooperation Financere en Afrique Centrale (the 
Central African Financial Cooperation), depending on the location of the nation 
(Boughton 1992, p. 35). 
3 The parity remained constant at 50 CFAF to 1 FF from 1948 to January 1994, 
when the CFA members and France agreed on a 50% devaluation, making the parity 
100 CFAF to 1 FF. The Comorian franc's parity was only devalued by 33% and stands 
at 75 CF to 1 FF. 
4 For further discussion of the Franc Zone and its institutions, see Clement (1994) 
or Appendix B of the Berg and Berlin study (1993). 
5 Variability could occur, but only with a change in parity that is not common for the 
Zone in this time period. 
6 Europe is a fairly stable zone for trade since the advent of the European 
Monetary System (EMS). Since France is a member of the EMS, CFA countries will 
enjoy some relative exchange rate stability in their trade with Europe. Note that the 
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7 
European system differs from that of the Franc Zone. Exchange rates are variable 
among European members, although the variability is restricted to a narrow band. 
Since a comprehensive source of bilateral rates was unavailable, the exchange 
rates were derived using the "conversion factor," in units of local currency per US dollar, 
from World Tables. To find the bilateral rates with each trading partner, the conversion 
factor was multiplied by the inverse of the conversion factor for France and by the rate 
of exchange between the French franc (FF) and the CFA franc (CFAF) for this time 
period 1 FF:50 CFAF. 
local ~ 1 FF = local 
US$ "FF " 50 CFAF CFAF 
Using quoted bilateral exchange rates or those calculated as cross-rates should not 
change the outcome significantly, since arbitrage by foreign currency traders brings spot 
rates close to each other. Any differences between the two rates would quickly 
disappear as traders sought a profit. 
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